Kaustubh Tripathi
South Caucasus, also known as the Trans-Caucasus region, situated South of the Caucasian mountain range of Europe, comprises of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Historically, the region was competed for establishing influence amongst the Ottoman and the Persian empires.
However, in the early 20th century, with the Russian revolution and the wave of Communism, the region eventually became a part of the Soviet Union. Upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the region continued to be under the hegemony of Russian Federation, reflected in the Political culture and functioning styles of the State institutions of the three South Caucasian countries.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which started in the year 2022, however, changed the regional dynamics. While Russia was busy in dealing with the Ukrainian forces and the sanctions imposed by the West, its relative absence as a consequence left the region with no superior power which resulted in the Power vacuum of the regional order. This created avenues for regional and extra-regional powers to establish their Strategic influence in the contested geopolitical space —rich in energy and situated at the critical geopolitical crossroads joining Europe and Asia. Consequently, the constituent countries of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia recalibrated their Strategic calculus and revised their geopolitical vision by diversifying their foreign policies. Türkiye, China, India, Pakistan and latest entrant, USA thus became the new variables in the regional geopolitical equation.
Russia invaded the Ukrainian territory with its “Special Military Operation” as a dominant regional power, but its involvement and further military and economic overstretch declined its capacity to influence the unfolding of geopolitical events in the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus region, largely known to the world due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hitherto managed with the Russian diplomatic, military and energy trade as the means, was left with no effective Russian presence. Nagorno-Karabakh thus got militarily resolved in favour of Azerbaijan with the help of Turkish military support and Azerbaijan emerged as more assertive and autonomous power in the region. It challenged the Russian hegemony more consistently than Armenia or Georgia, and helped Ukraine with humanitarian aid in the wake of the Russian attack. Also, it unilaterally revised the Russian-mediated 2020 ceasefire and took advantage of Russia’s weakness finalizing its territorial integrity in 2023. In turn, Russia’s dependence on Azerbaijan increased in terms of energy and diplomatic & economic link to the West Asian region[1].
Armenia, on the other hand, which had Russian military support, suspended its CSTO participation based on the premise that Russia failed to provide any effective security to Armenia in the wake of Azerbaijani offensive in 2020[2]. The public perception in Armenia vis-a-vis Russia also deteriorated sharply in a short span of time. Here, Russia’s old policy of ‘controlled instability’ backfired and as a result, destroyed Armenian trust in Russia.
As far as Georgia is concerned, since it is has vulnerabilities regarding the conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and being well aware of the fact that Russia holds leverage over Georgia, latter maintained a very cautious approach where it did not impose any sanctions on Russia. The domestic political environment of Georgia post 2024 elections went in favour of the pro-Russian forces. To add to it, the economic incentives which Georgia derives out of Russian incentives also prevented Georgia to diverge against Russia.
In the wake of Russian entrenchment in the Ukrainian theatre, Türkiye found an avenue to employ its assertive diplomacy and leverage ethnic affinities with Azerbaijan. To that effect, Türkiye not only helped Azerbaijan with Military and Intelligence support to capture the Nagorno-Karabakh region and get rid of the ethnic Armenians in the region but also signed Shusha declaration in 2022 with Azerbaijan, reflecting Turkish-Azerbaijani realignment in the region.
The Chinese involvement on the other hand in the South Caucasus grew with weakened Russian influence. China viewed the region as a critical, geopolitically potent space which holds immense significance for furthering Chinese Strategic footprint in the region. Although China remains cautious and avoids taking sides, largely investing in infrastructure and trade connectivity with an objective of structural reformation of the region and forging South Caucasus-Chinese interdependence[3].
India, a substantial South Asian player, also saw an opportunity in the South Caucasus to gain Strategic footing in order to look beyond its neighborhood, thus shaping its ‘trans-regional approach’ in foreign policy strategy. It employs niche diplomacy, in areas where it possesses relative advantage — like arms manufacturing, Pharmaceuticals and Information Technology sector. India’s approach majorly focuses Armenia, which is geopolitically vulnerable given Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine and Turkish-Azerbaijani axis which encircles Armenia in a tough situation. However, India’s presence in Caspian Sea basin — which is rich in energy and Indian tourism still reasonably decent in Azerbaijan, illustrates India’s cautious political posturing and policymaking.
Pakistan, on the other hand, as a consequence of Indian strategic alignment with Armenia, entered the South Caucasian geopolitics to balance India, aligning itself with Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis, polarizing the regional order[4]. Pakistani enthusiasm can be seen as an attempt to establish itself as a prominent Islamic Nation-State globally, thereby also imposing South Asian equations upon the South Caucasus geopolitical calculus.
USA, under President Trump has reconciled Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and proposed TRIPP — Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, joining Armenia and Azerbaijan through the Nakhchivan exclave. The American objective here seems more at isolating Iran, which has the only land route to reach Europe through Armenia. Tehran is apprehensive of the possible American control of the route and could possibly leverage its ethnic linkages with Azerbaijan to regain its influence and counterbalance American involvement.
With multiple interests at play and regionally polarized inter-state relations, energy rich geography and ethnic plurality rife with conflicts having roots in the past century, it demands a careful, well-negotiated and visionary Strategic outlook to navigate the region towards trust-building, establishing long-term peace and forging a path for prosperity and secure future, in political, economic as well as cultural terms[5].
Footnotes:
[1] Brusylovska, O., & Maistrenko, Y. (2024). Russia in the Politics of South Caucasus countries after 2022. Political Studies and International Relations, 5(1), 14-28.
[2] Aleksanyan, L. (2021). Foreign Policy of the South Caucasian Countries: Results and New Challenges. Central Asia and the Caucasus, Volume 22 No. 4.
[3] Fallahi, E., & Shafiee, N. (2023). Assessment of China’s China’s strategy in the South Caucasus: The cluster approach and BRI linkages. Central Eurasia Studies Review, 6(2), 47-62.
[4] Rauf, S., & Tariq, M. (2023). India and Pakistan’s growing engagement in the South Caucasus. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 10(2), 98-113.
[5] Iskandarov, K., & Gawliczek, P. (2020). The new Great Game in the South Caucasus. Journal of Scientific papers, Volume 10, Issue 1.